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Indonesia’s decision to withhold samples of avian in-
ﬂ  uenza virus A (H5N1) from the World Health Organization 
for much of 2007 caused a crisis in global health. The World 
Health Assembly produced a resolution to try to address the 
crisis at its May 2007 meeting. I examine how the parties 
to this controversy used international law in framing and 
negotiating the dispute. Speciﬁ  cally, I analyze Indonesia’s 
use of the international legal principle of sovereignty and its 
appeal to rules on the protection of biological and genetic 
resources found in the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
In addition, I consider how the International Health Regula-
tions 2005 applied to the controversy. The incident involving 
Indonesia’s actions with virus samples illustrates both the 
importance and the limitations of international law in global 
health diplomacy.
O
n May 23, 2007, the World Health Assembly (WHA) 
adopted a resolution on sharing inﬂ  uenza viruses and 
promoting access to vaccines in connection with pandemic 
inﬂ  uenza preparedness (1). This resolution constituted the 
latest development in a controversy sparked by Indonesia’s 
decision to withhold inﬂ  uenza A (H5N1) samples from 
the World Health Organization (WHO) (2). The negotia-
tions that produced WHA’s resolution involved complex 
international legal questions, which stimulated different 
answers from the parties involved. This article reviews this 
controversy and analyzes key international legal issues it 
generated.
Indonesia’s Decision to Withhold 
Inﬂ  uenza A Virus (H5N1) Samples
This controversy began toward the end of 2006, when 
Indonesia decided not to share inﬂ  uenza A virus (H5N1) 
samples with WHO for risk assessment (e.g., surveil-
lance) or risk management (e.g., vaccine development) 
purposes. Indonesia’s decision reportedly stemmed from 
its reaction to an Australian company’s development of 
an avian inﬂ  uenza vaccine derived from a virus strain that 
Indonesia provided to WHO (3). WHO’s acknowledg-
ment that patents had been sought on modiﬁ  ed versions 
of inﬂ  uenza (H5N1) samples shared through the Global 
Inﬂ  uenza Surveillance Network (GISN) without the con-
sent of the countries that supplied the samples reinforced 
Indonesia’s discontent. Indonesia argued that this incident 
exposed inequities in the global inﬂ  uenza surveillance 
system. Developing countries provided information and 
virus samples to the WHO-operated system; pharmaceu-
tical companies in industrialized countries then obtained 
free access to such samples, exploited them, and patented 
the resulting products, which the developing countries 
could not afford. Avian inﬂ  uenza’s spread and fears about 
pandemic inﬂ  uenza heightened this perceived inequity; 
experts argued that developing countries would have little 
access to vaccine for pandemic inﬂ  uenza without major 
changes in global vaccine production (4,5).
Indonesia’s action alarmed the global health commu-
nity. Indonesia has been hit hard by avian inﬂ  uenza (6), so 
its cooperation in tracking the inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) was 
critical. Without access to Indonesia’s inﬂ  uenza strains, 
global surveillance was jeopardized, as was the reﬁ  nement 
of diagnostic reagents and the development of intervention 
strategies, which depend on the information surveillance 
provides.
Regaining access to Indonesia’s samples motivated 
WHO to try to ﬁ  nd a solution to the problem that Indone-
sia highlighted. In essence, Indonesia was making sample 
sharing for risk assessment dependent on action taken by 
WHO and industrialized countries to increase Indonesia’s 
access to inﬂ  uenza vaccines derived from samples it pro-
Inﬂ  uenza Virus Samples, 
International Law, and Global 
Health Diplomacy
David P. Fidler*
PERSPECTIVE
88  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 14, No. 1, January 2008
*Indiana University School of Law, Bloomington, Indiana, USAInﬂ  uenza Virus, International Law, Global Diplomacy
vided. Restarting sample sharing and improving vaccine 
access proved difﬁ  cult and contentious. Before the WHA 
meeting in May 2007, negotiations between Indonesia and 
WHO did not produce agreement. For example, neither the 
Joint Statement issued by Indonesia and WHO in Febru-
ary 2007 (7) nor subsequent attempts to end the impasse 
succeeded (8). Independent efforts to increase vaccines ac-
cess, such as the agreement of the United States and Ja-
pan in March 2007 to provide $18 million to 6 developing 
countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand, and 
Vietnam) to facilitate the building of vaccine-manufactur-
ing capacity and of a vaccine stockpile (9), did not alter the 
stand-off.
The World Health Assembly’s Resolution
Agreement at WHA was reached only through last-
minute negotiations, which again illustrates the difﬁ  culties 
raised by Indonesia’s strategy to gain better access to in-
ﬂ  uenza vaccines. The WHA resolution sets out a series of 
actions to achieve both “the timely sharing of viruses and 
specimens” in GISN and the promotion of “transparent, fair 
and equitable sharing of the beneﬁ  ts arising from the gener-
ation of information, diagnostics, medicines, vaccines and 
other technologies” (1). Most of the resolution consists of 
requests by WHO member states for the director-general to 
undertake activities designed to achieve fair and equitable 
sharing of beneﬁ  ts derived from inﬂ  uenza surveillance ac-
tivities, especially access to vaccines (Table). 
Particularly important are the requests for the director-
general to convene a) a working group to review, and pro-
pose reforms for, the sharing of inﬂ  uenza viruses and their 
use within and outside GISN; and b) an intergovernmental 
working group to consider progress being made toward the 
resolution’s goals, especially fair and equitable access to 
inﬂ  uenza vaccine for developing countries. These requests 
ensure that the linkage between virus sample sharing and 
equitable access to inﬂ  uenza vaccine remains prominent on 
the global health agenda for the foreseeable future.
The resolution reﬂ  ects the current structure of global 
inﬂ  uenza governance (10). International sharing of inﬂ  u-
enza virus samples has occurred for decades within GISN 
(11). Although WHO and partners, such as the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and GAVI Alliance, 
have increased developing-country access to childhood 
vaccines, mechanisms for increasing these countries’ ac-
cess to inﬂ  uenza vaccines are weaker. Fears about avian 
inﬂ  uenza’s spread and the emergence of pandemic inﬂ  u-
enza highlighted the weakness of international efforts to 
increase vaccine availability in developing countries. The 
resolution attempts to build a multilateral process to ad-
dress the lack of fair and equitable access for developing 
countries to pharmacologic beneﬁ  ts derived from the shar-
ing of inﬂ  uenza virus samples. The resolution expresses a 
desire to craft a more equitable system of global inﬂ  uenza 
governance, the substantive elements of which remain to 
be negotiated.
Political Dynamics of Inﬂ  uenza Virus Samples 
and Sovereignty over Biological Resources
The need to improve inﬂ  uenza vaccine access was rec-
ognized before this controversy (4,5), but Indonesia’s will-
ingness to leverage control over virus samples to provoke 
more multilateral responses to the access problem changed 
the political dynamics of this issue. As typically happens 
when countries or international organizations challenge the 
status quo, the parties in this controversy framed their posi-
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Table. Summary of actions that World Heath Organization 
member states requested of director-general 
•   To identify and propose, in consultation with member states, 
frameworks and mechanisms that aim to ensure fair and 
equitable sharing of benefits among all member states, taking 
strongly into consideration the specific needs of developing 
countries
•   To establish, in consultation with member states, an 
international stockpile of vaccines for (H5N1) or other 
influenza viruses of pandemic potential 
•   To formulate mechanisms and guidelines, in consultation with 
member states, aimed at ensuring fair and equitable 
distribution of pandemic influenza vaccines at affordable prices
in the event of a pandemic to ensure timely availability of such 
vaccines to member states in need 
•   To mobilize financial, technical, and other appropriate support 
from member states, vaccine manufacturers, development 
banks, charitable organizations, private donors, and others to 
implement mechanisms and increase the equitable sharing of 
benefits as described in the resolution 
•   To convene an interdisciplinary working group to revise the 
terms of reference of WHO Collaborating Centers, H5 
Reference Laboratories, and national influenza centers, devise
oversight mechanisms, formulate draft standard terms and 
conditions for sharing viruses between originating countries 
and WHO Collaborating Centers, between the latter and third 
parties, and to review all relevant documents for sharing 
influenza viruses and sequencing data, based on mutual trust, 
transparency, and overriding principles 
•   To assure a member of the interdisciplinary working group 
consisting of 4 member states from each of the 6 WHO 
regions, taking into account balanced representation between 
industrialized and developing countries and including both 
experts and policymakers 
•   To convene an intergovernmental meeting to consider the 
reports by the director-general and by the interdisciplinary 
working group, which shall be open to all member states and 
regional economic organizations 
•   To commission an expert report on the patent issues related to 
influenza viruses and their genes, and report to the 
intergovernmental meeting 
•   To continue work with member states on the potential for 
conversion of existing biological facilities, such as those for the 
production of veterinary vaccines, so as to meet the standards 
for development and production of human vaccines, thereby 
increasing the availability of pandemic vaccines, and to enable 
them to receive vaccine seed strains 
•   To report on progress on implementation of the resolution to 
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tions by using international law. This section analyzes how 
the stakeholders used international law to shape the debate. 
This incident illustrated the importance and limitations of 
international law in global health diplomacy.
By withholding samples, Indonesia asserted sovereign-
ty over them because they originated within its territory. 
Despite controversies surrounding it, the principle of sov-
ereignty remains a central tenet of international law (12). 
Traditionally, sovereignty holds that a state has authority 
and control over the people, resources, and activities within 
its territory (12). International law supplements sovereign-
ty with the rule prohibiting states from intervening in each 
other’s domestic affairs (12). Limits on sovereignty arise 
when the state agrees to follow rules of international law 
found in treaties or customary international law.
In essence, Indonesia claimed that the samples are its 
sovereign property and do not constitute resources that 
other countries or the international community can access 
and use without Indonesia’s consent. This claim cut against 
the ethos and practice of sample sharing under which GISN 
had operated. This ethos and practice are based on access-
ing and analyzing inﬂ  uenza virus samples to produce ac-
curate surveillance data, which inform development of in-
terventions (e.g., vaccines).
Indonesia did not equate this ethos with an interna-
tional legal obligation to engage in sharing that limited its 
sovereign rights over the samples. From a legal perspec-
tive, Indonesia’s arguments were plausible. GISN was not 
organized under treaty law, so no countries had treaty obli-
gations to share samples. In addition, international law on 
infectious diseases applicable to Indonesia when this con-
troversy began contained no obligations to share samples 
with WHO. The most relevant international legal rules, the 
International Health Regulations (IHRs) adopted by WHO 
in 1969 (IHR 1969), did not include inﬂ  uenza as a disease 
subject to the Regulations, nor did IHR 1969 require shar-
ing of biological samples for the diseases covered (13).
Whether sharing obligations arose under customary in-
ternational law when this controversy arose is also doubtful. 
To rise to the level of customary law, evidence must exist 
that states generally and consistently follow a practice out of 
a sense of legal obligation (12). GISN has, however, func-
tioned without much, if any, reference to international law, 
making it difﬁ  cult to establish that countries shared samples 
with WHO because they felt legally obligated to do so.
Sovereignty Claims and the Application 
of Convention on Biological Diversity 
In addition to exploiting basic principles of interna-
tional law, Indonesia exploited precedents in other areas 
to bolster its sovereignty claims over the samples. Speciﬁ  -
cally, Indonesia borrowed from the international law de-
veloped to address biological diversity. The Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) recognizes that countries have 
sovereign control of biological resources found within their 
territories (14). CBD deﬁ  nes biological resources to include 
“genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, 
or any other biotic component of ecosystems with actual 
or potential use or value for humanity” (article 2). Genetic 
resources are deﬁ  ned to mean “genetic material of actual 
or potential value”; genetic material means “any material 
of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing func-
tional units of heredity” (article 2). CBD further states that 
“the authority to determine access to genetic resources rests 
with the national governments and is subject to national 
legislation” (article 15.1). In addition, “access to genetic 
resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of the 
Contracting Party providing such resources” (article 15.5). 
Any access granted “shall be on mutually agreed terms” 
(article 15.4).
Indonesia’s claims that it controlled access to samples 
collected in its territory, that no use of such samples by other 
parties could occur without its prior informed consent, and 
that any use of such samples should produce beneﬁ  ts for 
Indonesia reﬂ  ect the approach taken in CBD. Evidence that 
Indonesia framed the controversy by using these principles 
can be found in WHA’s 2007 resolution, which states that 
the Assembly “[r]ecogniz[es] the sovereign right of States 
over their biological resources” (preamble).
However, equating inﬂ  uenza virus samples with bio-
logical resources addressed by CBD raises questions that 
undermine Indonesia’s use of CBD. To begin, interpreting 
CBD to apply to pathogenic viruses may be contrary to 
CBD’s purpose. CBD was created, in part, to help develop-
ing countries rich in biological diversity control access to 
this diversity to conserve and manage it for sustainable de-
velopment. Developing countries were concerned that cor-
porate entities from industrialized countries were accessing 
their biological diversity and creating proﬁ  table products 
without the populations of these developing countries ben-
eﬁ  ting. Critics called this practice biopiracy (15,16).
Thus, the biological and genetic materials of primary 
CBD concern are indigenous resources in which govern-
ments, communities, and persons have invested time, ef-
fort, and resources to protect, cultivate, understand, and 
use. CBD provides that “States have sovereign rights over 
their own biological resources” (preamble [emphasis add-
ed]). In short, companies in the industrialized world were 
unjustly enriching themselves by proﬁ  ting from previous 
efforts made in the developing country.
The avian inﬂ  uenza viruses affecting Indonesia are 
not the kind of biological and genetic resources that CBD 
sought to protect and regulate through the principles of sov-
ereignty, prior informed consent, and mutual beneﬁ  ts from 
access and exploitation. These viruses invaded Indonesia; 
their presence and spread owes nothing to the investment, 
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nurturing, and utilization of the Indonesian government 
or people. Rather than seeking to conserve this virus, the 
strategy is to contain and ultimately eradicate it. Applying 
CBD’s principles to inﬂ  uenza virus samples seems inap-
propriate given the difference between CBD’s object and 
purpose and the threat posed by inﬂ  uenza viruses.
State practice under CBD supports the conclusion that 
CBD does not apply to avian inﬂ  uenza virus. States parties 
to CBD have addressed avian inﬂ  uenza, not as a biological 
resource subject to CBD but as a threat to biological di-
versity. CBD discussions of avian inﬂ  uenza have consid-
ered its potential impact on wildlife, and the CBD process 
emphasized that surveillance is critical for combating avi-
an inﬂ  uenza’s threat to biological diversity. Surveillance 
suffers without sharing information and samples of avian 
inﬂ  uenza viruses (17). Rather than protecting biological 
diversity, as mandated by CBD, Indonesia’s withholding 
virus samples from global surveillance efforts jeopardizes 
biological diversity in addition to population health.
Using CBD as a template in the context of inﬂ  uenza 
virus samples may be questionable on other grounds (18). 
The deﬁ  nitions of biological resources and genetic resourc-
es emphasize that the resources in question should be of 
actual or potential use or value for humanity. When these 
deﬁ  nitions are read in conjunction with CBD’s principles, 
this potential use or value for humanity is understood to 
derive from the protection, conservation, and sustainable 
use of the resources in question. CBD uses the principle 
of sovereignty as a regulatory instrument to achieve these 
goals. The use or value for humanity of inﬂ  uenza viruses 
comes from their widespread sharing for surveillance and 
vaccine development purposes because of the global threat 
such viruses pose. In this context, the principle of sover-
eignty central to the CBD approach is not a useful basis for 
facilitating timely and comprehensive sharing that global 
health governance requires.
Virus Sharing and the Application of IHR 2005
One reason Indonesia stressed the CBD is that it pro-
vided a way to ﬁ  nesse the implications of the revised IHRs 
adopted by WHA in May 2005 (IHR 2005) (19), which 
provide that “[t]he provisions of the IHR shall not affect the 
rights and obligations of any State Party deriving from other 
international agreements” (article 57.1). Appeal to this rule 
begs the question raised by the ﬁ  rst sentence of article 57.1, 
which states that “the IHR and other relevant international 
agreements should be interpreted so as to be compatible.” 
Thus, interpreting IHR 2005 became important in the con-
troversy over inﬂ  uenza virus (H5N1) sharing. IHR 2005 
is a treaty, “an international agreement concluded between 
States in written form and governed by international law” 
(20). This controversy represented an early test for how 
IHR 2005 would be interpreted and applied.
IHR 2005’s use proved complex for technical and sub-
stantive reasons. Technically, IHR 2005 had no binding 
force under international law until it ofﬁ  cially entered into 
force on June 15, 2007. Thus, IHR 2005 created no inter-
national legal obligations for Indonesia with respect to the 
withholding of samples in the period before the Regulations 
entered into force. However, IHR 2005’s imminent entry 
into force made its substantive provisions relevant to the 
negotiations over Indonesia’s position on virus sharing.
Under international law, a state must refrain from acts 
that would defeat a treaty’s object and purpose when the 
state has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, 
pending the treaty’s entry into force (20). Indonesia had 
expressed its consent to be bound by IHR 2005 because 
it did not reject IHR 2005, or submit reservations to it, by 
the December 2006 deadline to do so. Thus, whether In-
donesia’s decision to withhold samples constituted an act 
that would defeat the object and purpose of the IHR 2005 
became a relevant question. Criticisms that Indonesia’s ac-
tion fundamentally jeopardized global health security—the 
very object of IHR 2005 (21)—demonstrate that Indonesia 
could be considered in violation of its duty to not defeat the 
object and purpose of IHR 2005 before its entry into force.
This argument is supported by the claim that had IHR 
2005 actually been in force, Indonesia would have vio-
lated its obligation to share samples. WHO Director-Gen-
eral Margaret Chan argued at the WHA meeting in May 
2007 “that countries that did not share avian inﬂ  uenza vi-
rus would fail the IHR” (22). Addressing the credibility 
of these legal claims requires interpreting what IHR 2005 
mandates States Parties to disclose and share with WHO. 
At least 2 differing interpretations exist. The ﬁ  rst interpre-
tation argues that IHR 2005 requires States Parties to share 
relevant biological samples as part of the duty to provide 
WHO with accurate and detailed public health information 
about all events that might constitute a public health emer-
gency of international concern (PHEIC). Given that the 
spread of highly pathogenic inﬂ  uenza viruses is considered 
a PHEIC, the IHR 2005 mandates that States Parties pro-
vide WHO with samples for surveillance purposes without 
preconditions or expectations of beneﬁ  ts in return.
Supporting this interpretation is a WHA resolution 
adopted in May 2006, which called upon WHO member 
states “to comply immediately, on a voluntary basis, with 
provisions of the IHR 2005 considered relevant to the risk 
posed by avian inﬂ  uenza and pandemic inﬂ  uenza” (para. 
1) (23). This resolution urged WHO member states “to dis-
seminate to WHO collaborating centres information and 
relevant biological materials related to highly pathogenic 
avian inﬂ  uenza and other novel inﬂ  uenza strains in a timely 
and consistent manner” (para. 4[5]). The encouragement to 
share biological materials with WHO could be considered 
authoritative guidance from WHO’s highest policymaking 
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body about the scope of the obligation to share public health 
information with WHO with respect to all events that might 
constitute a PHEIC.
This interpretation was succinctly stated by the US 
delegation to WHA: “All nations have a responsibility un-
der the revised IHRs to share data and virus samples on a 
timely basis and without preconditions. The United States 
wishes to be clear that our view is that withholding inﬂ  uen-
za viruses from GISN greatly threatens global public health 
and will violate the legal obligations we have all agreed to 
undertake through our adherence to IHRs” (24).
Even though IHR 2005 never expressly requires the 
sharing of biological samples, a good faith interpretation of 
IHR 2005 in light of its object and purpose acknowledges 
a duty to share such samples for surveillance purposes. An 
opposite interpretation could lead to a manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable result, which treaty interpretation principles 
do not support. This interpretation of IHR 2005 also is 
compatible with CBD because IHR 2005 requires sample 
sharing for risk assessment purposes, not risk management 
activities. Thus, the sharing mandate in IHR 2005 does 
not preclude WHO and its member states from crafting ar-
rangements to improve access to beneﬁ  ts, such as vaccines, 
derived from samples shared for surveillance purposes.
The second interpretation comes to the opposite con-
clusion. This position asserts that, under principles of treaty 
interpretation, IHR 2005 does not require States Parties to 
share biological samples with WHO. The ﬁ  rst principle of 
treaty interpretation is that a treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light 
of its object and purpose (20). IHR 2005 requires States Par-
ties to provide WHO with “public health information” about 
events that may constitute a PHEIC (article 6). IHR 2005 
does not deﬁ  ne what “public health information” means, so 
its meaning has to be discerned through treaty interpretation 
principles. The second interpretation holds that the ordinary 
meaning of “information” encompasses knowledge and facts 
(25) but does not include biological samples.
The second interpretation maintains that IHR 2005, its 
negotiations, and the WHA resolutions of 2006 and 2007 
support it. Nowhere does IHR 2005 contain any express 
requirement to share samples of biological materials. The 
only provision that refers to biological substances provides 
that: “States Parties shall, subject to national law and tak-
ing into account relevant international guidelines, facilitate 
the transport, entry, exit, processing and disposal of bio-
logical substances and diagnostic specimens, reagents and 
other diagnostic materials for veriﬁ  cation and public health 
response purposes under these Regulations” (article 46). 
The use of “biological substances” here suggests that the 
negotiators considered this concept separate from “public 
health information.”
The provision that contains the duty to communicate 
public health information to WHO about a reported event 
also contains a list of things that fall within this obliga-
tion: case deﬁ  nitions, laboratory results, source and type 
of risk, number of cases and deaths, conditions affecting 
the spread of disease, and the health measures used (article 
6.2). This list refers to things that would fall within the 
ordinary meaning of “information” and contains nothing 
that could be considered biological samples, substances, or 
specimens. The absence of express reference to biological 
samples is particularly telling in light of the fact that WHO 
and its member states were, at the time IHR 2005 was being 
negotiated, aware of concerns about the failure of coun-
tries to share samples of pathogens of global concern (e.g., 
the severe acute respiratory syndrome virus, the inﬂ  uenza 
[H5N1] virus) for surveillance and other purposes.
Similarly, an earlier negotiating text included the fol-
lowing provision: “In the context of a suspected intentional 
release of a biological, chemical or radionuclear agent, 
States shall immediately provide to WHO all relevant public 
health information, materials and samples, for veriﬁ  cation 
and response purposes” (26). Here again, the negotiators 
used “public health information” and “samples” as distinct 
terms. Further, this provision does not appear in IHR 2005. 
Even if it had so appeared, it would have underscored that 
sharing samples was only required in connection with sus-
pected intentional use of a biological, chemical, or radionu-
clear agent, which does not include the natural emergence 
of avian or pandemic inﬂ  uenza.
WHA resolutions of 2006 and 2007 also support this 
interpretation. The 2006 resolution on early compliance 
with IHR 2005 with respect to inﬂ   uenza threats urges 
WHO member states to disseminate to WHO “information 
and relevant biological materials” (23) (emphasis added), 
which further demonstrates that WHO member states con-
sider public health information and biological materials 
different, not equivalent, terms. WHA’s 2007 resolution 
uses the same language in recalling the 2006 resolution’s 
urging of WHO member states to disseminate information 
and relevant biological materials (1). This interpretation is 
also compatible with CBD because it leaves the decision 
whether to share biological samples in the hands of the 
state party in which the samples originate.
Beyond Differing Treaty Interpretations 
and the WHA Resolution
Stepping back from the differing treaty interpretations, 
Indonesia’s actions exposed ambiguity in a critical aspect 
of IHR 2005 on the eve of its entry into force. The WHA’s 
2007 resolution did not resolve this controversy because, 
on this question, its provisions provide no clear answer. 
The resolution reafﬁ  rms the obligations of States Parties 
under IHR 2005 and the sovereign right of states over their 
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biological resources, a key principle in CBD. The bargain 
that underpins the resolution has, however, established the 
utility of countries’ withholding samples to force WHO 
and industrialized countries to address neglected aspects of 
global inﬂ  uenza governance. Dueling treaty interpretations 
may matter less than the old legal adage that possession of 
property in dispute is nine-tenths of the law. When posses-
sion is cloaked in the principle of sovereignty, those who 
require access to the property have to come to terms with 
the need to bargain for it.
Conceptually, the WHA’s 2007 resolution seeks to 
achieve equitable use of inﬂ   uenza virus samples. Such 
equitable use encompasses timely sharing of samples for 
global surveillance and more effort to ensure that develop-
ing countries share in the beneﬁ  ts of knowledge and tech-
nologies derived from the samples, especially inﬂ  uenza 
vaccines. Equitable use has not occurred because sharing 
inﬂ  uenza virus samples proves easier than producing eq-
uitable access to technologies derived from the knowledge 
produced by surveillance. The resolution itself obviously 
does not produce equitable use, but it establishes a WHO-
based process for moving global health diplomacy in this 
direction. The resolution is a general blueprint for building 
new global governance mechanisms on equitable use of 
inﬂ  uenza samples. This blueprint is, however, technically 
limited to inﬂ  uenza virus sharing and vaccine develop-
ment, and its creation raises questions about governance of 
the sharing of samples of other pathogens of global concern 
and of beneﬁ  ts derived from such samples.
WHO and its member states had started the process 
described in the resolution by, among other things, meet-
ing in Singapore in July 2007 and scheduling another in-
tergovernmental session in November 2007. The meeting 
in Singapore did not produce consensus, and Indonesia 
continued to withhold the samples (27). In reporting on the 
Singapore meeting, Branswell observed that many feared 
the talks would follow Indonesia’s lead and produce “a sys-
tem where countries would exercise sovereign rights over 
viruses or bacteria found within their borders, seeking quid 
pro quos from vaccine makers or assessing the potential 
for gain before co-operating with global health authori-
ties to squelch new disease threats like SARS.” (28) Me-
dia reported in September 2007 that Indonesia had shared 
some virus samples with WHO related to 2 fatal inﬂ  uenza 
(H5N1) cases in Bali (29), but this action did not mean that 
Indonesia had abandoned or repudiated the position it had 
staked out on virus sharing and access to vaccine. Thus, 
as of this writing, the fundamental issues at the heart of 
this controversy, including the international legal questions 
analyzed in this article, had not been resolved.
Whether the process sketched in WHA’s resolution 
produces an effective multilateral regime for equitable use 
remains to be seen. The process itself is not legally binding 
because WHA resolutions do not have the force of interna-
tional law (30). The agreement to create this process will 
perpetuate legal disagreements about sovereignty, CBD, 
IHR 2005, and other legal issues (e.g., intellectual property 
rights) because neither side currently has an interest in hav-
ing the legal questions deﬁ  nitively answered. Instead, con-
structive legal ambiguity informs the political willingness 
of countries to shoulder the equitable use responsibilities 
the WHA resolution envisions.
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